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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over review 
of the administrative order of the Utah Industrial Commission 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 35-1-86 and § 63-46b-16. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Respondent accepts petitioner' s statement of the issues but 
questions the standards of review. For clarification, however, 
it is necessary to add a third issue: 
3. Does the evidence support the Industrial 
Commission' s Findings of Fact leading to its 
legal conclusion that no industrial injury 
occurred. 
The "substantial evidence" standard is appropriate if petitioner 
were challenging the factual findings of the Industrial 
Commission. Because petitioner has not clearly stated this as an 
issue, respondent will rely on the record to show that there is 
substantial credible evidence to support the findings of the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission. Further, 
if petitioner is challenging the factual findings of the court, 
she must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that it is insufficient to support those findings. 
State v. Wright, 893 P2d 1113 (Utah App 1995). 
The specific issues stated by petitioner do not address 
those factual findings in the normal sense. In fact, 
petitioner' s first stated issue implies application of an 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. In support of this 
standard, Ms. Romero cites Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 
389 P2d 730 (Utah 1964). A computer search of Utah cases turned 
up no other case which relies on Nicholson for this premise. A 
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more correct statement of the appropriate standard is set forth 
in Bigfoof s, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,714 P2d 1152, 1153 
(Utah 1986). ("In reviewing findings made by the Industrial 
Commission, the appellate court determines only whether the 
findings are supported by substantial evidence, (emphasis 
added)). There is, according to Utah law, no basis for concluding 
that the arbitrary/capricious standard is the appropriate 
standard of review. 
Petitioner fails to discuss her second issue in the body of 
her argument. To the extent that this issue is accepted as a 
valid issue for appeal, the applicability of Allen to the facts 
of this case is a question of law and the appropriate standard of 
review is for correctness. Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l 
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994); State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1269-70 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16z 
The appellate court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency1 s record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied 
by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the 
court. 
Utah Code Ann S 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case before the Industrial Commission was a claim for 
compensation allegedly arising from a workplace injury to Betty 
Ann Romero1 s lower back which occurred subsequent to two previous 
injuries, also allegedly arising in the workplace. Though Ms. 
Romero denied any preexisting physical injury, the medical record 
before the Administrative Law Judge clearly showed that she had 
sought medical treatment for lower back injuries and the evidence 
showed that she sought treatment for such back problems just two 
weeks prior to the first alleged industrial injury. 
Based upon the evidence from the hearing and, in part, upon 
the Administrative Law Judges's evaluation of the credibility of 
Ms. Romero' s testimony, the administrative law judge denied 
benefits because Ms. Romero failed to demonstrate that an 
industrial injury occurred, as required by law. 
Ms. Romero moved the Industrial Commission for review of the 
ALJ1 s decision. The Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ' s 
decision, concluding that the alleged industrial accidents did 
not occur as alleged. 
Ms. Romero has now petitioned this court for review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent objects to petitioner's "Statement of Relevant 
Facts" to the extent that (1) they lack citations to the record 
as required by rule and (2) they state inferences as to what "the 
Administrative Law Judge appears to have found." What the 
administrative law judge found is a matter of record set forth in 
the Findings of Fact. Any other "findings" are irrelevant. 
1. On January 16, 1991, Ms. Romero returned to an InstaCare 
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facility complaining of lower back pain of one-month duration. 
(T. at 45:2-18). On that visit, Ms. Romero reported that she had 
fallen * three months ago with three to four inch bruise over LS 
spine [lumbo-sacral or lower spine]." (T. 45:19-23) 
2. On November 14, 1991, Ms. Romero went to an InstaCare 
Center where she reported that she had "pain in low back with 
pressure constantly." (T. at 43:1-10). 
3. On or about October 27, 1992, Ms. Romero sought and 
received medical treatment for a lumbar sprain. (ALJ' s Findings 
of Pact, H 3, citing medical records pp. 43, 46; T. at 40.) 
4. Ms. Romero's first claimed workplace injury allegedly 
occurred on November 10, 1992 while she was employed by Little 
America. (Petitioner's Brief, Addendum A). Her employer was 
notified of her claim of workplace injury on November 18, 1992. 
Id. 
5. Ms. Romero1 s next alleged industrial accident was 
claimed on February 28, 1993 while she was employed by Little 
America. (Petitioner1 s Brief, Addendum B). 
6. The alleged workplace injury which brought this matter 
before the industrial commission occurred on September 25, 1993 
while Ms. Romero worked for Quality Inn. (Petitioner1 s Brief, 
Addendum C)• 
7. At the hearing before the ALJ, Ms. Romero, despite the 
objective, contemporaneously recorded medical record, denied she 
had injured her back in December of 1991. (ALJ1 s Findings of 
Fact, 11 2) . 
8. At the hearing, Ms. Romero gave testimony creating 
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confusion about the factual circumstances of her alleged 
industrial accidents, despite the fact that they all occurred 
within a one-year period. E.g., (T. at 13:20-25, 14:1) 
(testimony under direct examination by her counsel that Nov. 10, 
1992 injury resulted from cleaning toilets);(T. at 41:21-25, 
42:1-7) (testimony under cross examination that she was not 
lifting anything at the time of the first accident); (T. at 20:4-
9) (testimony under direct examination by her counsel that she 
the Feb 28, 1993 injury resulted from making a bed). 
9. Despite medical records to the contrary, Ms. Romero 
testified that she had never injured her back prior to the 
November 10, 1992 incident. (T. at 14:12-18) (testimony under 
direct examination by her counsel that she had never seen a 
physician for back pain prior to November 10, 1992); (T. at 
42:20-25) (testimony under cross examination that she had never 
had previous lower back pain)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ms. Romero fails to identify which portion of the test in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) she 
objects to and why it was error for the Commission to rely on 
Allen. Allen unquestionably applies to all claims for industrial 
injury because it identifies the requisite elements of a prima 
facie claim. Allen also applies to any case where there is a 
preexisting condition closely related to the claimed injury and 
identifies the burden of proof to be met in establishing 
causation. The Commission' s reliance on Allen was appropriate. 
It is entirely within the prerogative of the finder of fact 
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to weigh the credibility and relevance of evidence and to rely on 
credible evidence to the exclusion of other evidence. The issue 
is whether the evidence in the record, relied upon by the finder 
of fact, was relevant and of such a nature that a reasonable 
person could base the conclusion on that evidence. In this 
record, there is substantial evidence that Ms. Romero had a 
preexisting lower back problem prior to her first alleged 
industrial injury. 
The conclusion that there was a pre-existing lower back 
problem imposed upon Ms. Romero the burden to provide by a 
preponderance of credible evidence that she exerted herself in 
the workplace beyond the level of normal everyday exertion in 
order to establish the element of causation. Ms. Romero failed 
to carry this burden, with the result that the only reasonable 
finding is the one entered by the Commission, that, as a matter 
of law, there were no industrial injuries. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY APPLIED 
ALLEN V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. IN ALL 
RESPECTS, TO MS. ROMERO'S CLAIMS. 
The Workers' Compensation Act provides for compensation 
where a worker •is injured . . . by accident arising out of and 
in the course of his employment. . ." Utah Code Ann § 35-1-45. 
This statute imposes two requirements which must be met for a 
worker' s injury to be compensable under the Act: (1) the injury 
must be by accident, and (2) there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the employment. Stokes v. Board of 
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Review, 832 P2d 56, 60 (Utah App 1992); Allen at 18. An 
" accident" is defined as "an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence." Allen at 22. The three incidents which Ms. Romero 
claims were industrial injuries qualify as accidents because they 
were unexpected and unintended. 
The second step in the Allen analysis requires proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence of a causal connection between the 
accident and the injury. Stokes at 60, Allen at 23. This prong 
also has a two elements: (1) proof of legal causation and (2) 
proof of medical causation. Allen at 25. 
The analytical framework of Allen applies to all claims of 
industrial injury. As a result, it was properly applied by the 
Commission in evaluating Ms. Romero1 s claims. To establish a 
prima facie case, consistent with Allen, a claimant must show 
that an accident occurred and that there was legal and medical 
causation of the resulting injury. 
There is a second test established by Allen in cases where a 
worker has a preexisting condition related to the claimed injury. 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a 
claimant with a preexisting condition must 
show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition. This additional element of risk 
in the workplace is usually supplied by an 
exertion greater than that undertaken in 
normal, everyday life. 
Allen at 25. 
[W]here the claimant suffers from a 
preexisting condition which contributes to 
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary 
exertion is required to prove legal 
causation. 
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* * * 
[T]he precipitating exertion must be compared 
with the usual wear and tear and exertions of 
nonemployment lifef not the nonemployment 
life of the particular worker. 
Allen at 26. Included in the factors which are normal is the 
ability to lift a small child to chest height.1 Id. 
The record before the administrative law judge clearly shows 
that Ms. Romero had suffered at least two injuries to her lower 
back prior to the first claimed industrial injury which would 
have given rise to the conclusion that a preexisting injury was 
present. It was, therefore, appropriate for the ALJ and the 
Industrial Commission to rely upon the Allen analysis for 
preexisting conditions in reaching their conclusions. As 
discussed below, Ms. Romero simply failed to meet her burden to 
establish that her work-related accidents caused her injuries. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT MUST DEFER TO THE ALJ AND THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON THE ISSUES OF 
CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. IN 
ADDITION, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN 
THE RECORD SUPPORTING THE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
THEREFORE, THE CONCLUSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION MAY NOT BE OVERTURNED. 
In reviewing findings made by the Industrial Commission, the 
appellate court determines only whether the findings are 
supported by substantial evidence. Bigfoot's, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission,714 P2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). The 
finder of fact may choose what evidence to believe and how much 
weight to give to it without interference from the appellate 
court. 
1
 In his findings of fact, the administrative law judge employed this standard. E.g., findings 8 and 9. 
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This is a case in which the evidence was in 
conflict and the fact finder chose to believe 
the witnesses and evidence presented by the 
claimant, rather than the witnesses and 
evidence presented by the employer. In such 
a case, this Court has no power to determine 
the weight of the evidence and credibility of 
the witnesses . . ." 
Id. at 1153, (citations omitted). The ALJ or the Industrial 
Commission, as finder of fact, are free to reject evidence even 
if it is uncontroverted. "[T]he fact finder is in the best 
position to judge the credibility of a witness and may disbelieve 
witness testimony even if it is uncontroverted." Featherstone v. 
Industrial Commission, 877 P2d 1251, 1254 (Utah App 1994), citing 
Homer v. Smith, 866 P2d 622, 627 (Utah App 1993). 
Even if the evidence may form the basis for a conclusion 
different from that reached by the Commission, where there is 
substantial evidence in support of the Commission' s finding, it 
must be affirmed. Higgins v. Industrial Commission, 700 P2d 704, 
706 (Utah 1985). See also Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 
776 P2d 63, 68 (Utah App 1989). Substantial evidence is defined 
as relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion. Grace Drilling at 68. In 
applying the substantial evidence test, the appellate court must 
review the whole record, not just the portions relied upon by the 
party challenging the findings. Grace Drilling at 68. 
It is also important to note that the party challenging the 
findings must marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the Commission, the evidence is 
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insufficient to support the findings. State v. Wright, 893 P2d 
1113 (Utah App 1995); Grace Drilling at 68; Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P2d 1068f 1070 (Utah 1985). 
As a threshold issue, it is clear that Ms. Romero has failed 
to carry the burden of marshaling the evidence as required by 
appellate law. Ms. Romero carefully selects items from among the 
evidence presented at the hearing to create what appears to be a 
factual situation which doesn' t support the conclusions of the 
ALJ or the Commission. This does not meet Ms. Romero's burden to 
marshal the evidence and as such, Ms. Romero cannot mount a 
proper challenge to the factual findings of the Commission or the 
ALJ. 
Ms. Romero's accusation that the "Industrial Commission 
arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor of 
unsubstantial contradictory evidence" suffers from two 
weaknesses. The first is simply that she is attempting to remedy 
on appeal a failure at the hearing to resolve the inconsistency 
of the evidence introduced by her. In her brief, Ms. Romero tries 
to paint her version of the facts to which she testified as 
innocent confusion and faulty memory. However, Ms. Romero' s 
testimony takes up 88 pages of the 121 pages of hearing 
transcript. At no time, either on direct examination by her 
counsel, on cross examination or on re-direct examination by her 
counsel was any attempt made to set the record straight. Even on 
cross examination, 79 pages into her 88 pages of testimony, Ms. 
Romero stayed with her version of the facts despite having the 
inconsistency pointed out to her. 
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Q (by Mr. Tolboe) 
Ms. Romero, I don' t mean to confuse you or 
anything# but is it possible that you have the 
incidents regarding making the bed and the toilet 
incident confused and reversed? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. You believe that you actually injured 
yourself leaning over the toilet — 
A. Yes. 
Q# — in late October or early November 1992? 
A. Something like that. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And you remember injuring your back lifting 
the bed in late February of 1993? 
A. Uh huh. 
(T. 79:14-25, 80:1-3). 
Immediately after Mr. Tolboe' s cross-examination, Ms. 
Romero' s counsel conducted a re-direct examination. (T. 81) At 
no time during this re-direct was any attempt made to correct the 
testimony which Ms. Romero now characterizes as erroneous. 
If there was conflict between the submitted documents and 
Ms. Romero' s testimony resulting in confusion, it was not the 
fault of the ALJ. If the ALJ chooses to take this inconsistency 
(80 pages of testimony out of 88) to evaluate the credibility of 
Ms. Romero' s testimony, it was appropriate to do so. 
Having introduced and relied upon contradictory testimony at 
her hearing, Ms. Romero would now like this court to fix the 
problem. This is clearly inappropriate. It is the burden of the 
parties before the ALJ to establish the record. It is the 
prerogative of the ALJ as finder of fact to evaluate the record, 
believe what he will and to reach a decision based upon the 
credible evidence in the record. 
This points out the second problem with Ms. Romero' s 
argument: she ignores the function of the finder of fact in our 
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legal system. It is the responsibility of the finder of fact to 
hear the evidence, evaluate the credibility of testifying 
witnesses, make choices between conflicting evidence and reach a 
factual conclusion based upon the remaining substantial evidence. 
Substantial evidence, by definition, must be relevant 
evidence; that is, relevant to the elements of the prima facie 
case. The evidence upon which Ms. Romero so heavily relies is 
relevant only to the first portion of the Allen analysis, i.e., 
whether an accident occurred. That evidence is irrelevant, at 
least in this case, to the second prong of the Allen test, 
establishing legal and medical causation. To establish this 
second element, Ms. Romero needed to demonstrate with a 
preponderance of factual evidence either (1) there was no 
preexisting condition which would impose upon her a higher burden 
of proof, or (2) that her physical exertion on each of the three 
claimed accident dates was in excess of that which an individual 
would put forth in everyday living. She did neither of these. 
By contrast, there is substantial evidence in the record to 
show that Ms. Romero did, in fact, have a preexisting lower back 
problem prior to the November 10, 1992 accident. The medical 
records show that on at least two and probably three occasions 
prior to the November 1992 incident, Ms. Romero sought treatment 
for severe, persistent lower back pain. The medical record shows 
that on October 27, 1992, two weeks prior to the first alleged 
industrial injury, Ms. Romero was treated for lumbar sprain. 
There is no evidence of record that she had fully recovered from 
that sprain. Given the short period of time, it is reasonable to 
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infer that she had probably not fully recovered from the sprain. 
This evidence is both relevant to the issue of whether there 
was a preexisting injury and provides a basis from which a 
reasonable person could conclude that there was a preexisting 
lower back injury at the time of the November 10, 1992 incident. 
Even if the ALJ had not entered findings questioning Ms. 
Romero' s credibility and had accepted the injury report forms as 
establishing dates of injuries, that evidence only establishes 
that an accident occurred. It does not overcome the separate 
evidence of preexisting injury nor satisfy the burden of proof 
for legal and medical causation. Ms. Romero presented no medical 
evidence that any of the three alleged industrial accidents 
aggravated a preexisting lower back injury. She presented no 
evidence that the physical exertion she put forth was in excess 
of that required for everyday living (e.g., lifting a small child 
to chest height). There is no evidence as to causation, much 
less a preponderance of evidence as required by law. Absent any 
proper proof of causation, the ALJ and the Industrial Commission 
had no choice but to conclude that there was no causation. 
The record does not demonstrate that the ALJ arbitrarily 
disregarded competent evidence in support of unsubstantial 
contradictory evidence. Rather it demonstrates that the ALJ, as 
finder of factf weighed the evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses and selected substantial evidence upon which to base 
his findings. The decision of the ALJ and Industrial Commission 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
All of the analytical elements of Allen v. Industrial 
Commission are applicable to this case and were properly applied 
by the administrative law judge in his analysis of whether Ms. 
Romero established her claims that she had suffered industrial 
injuries. 
Ms. Romero has failed to marshal the evidence in her 
challenge of the facts. Even so, there is no evidence that the 
ALJ or the Commission acted arbitrarily and there is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the findings of the ALJ and the 
Commission. As a matter of law, the determination of the 
Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this / ' day of August, 1995. 
CHRISTOPHER TOLBOE 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
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